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The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 confers limited but significant rights on people with disabilities in the United Kingdom.
In this article we focus on the protection that the Act offers to people with epilepsy in the sphere of employment. We examine
the exempt categories of employment and the extent to which epilepsy qualifies as a disability for statutory purposes. We go on
to explore the impact of the new law on the recruitment and employment experience of people with epilepsy. The shortcomings
of the legislation are highlighted and improvements, which would benefit people with epilepsy, are recommended. Claims
featuring epilepsy, brought under the Act, are analysed to illustrate how the legislation is being interpreted and applied.
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The employment provisions of the Disability Discrim-
ination Act 1995 (hereafter referred to as the DDA)
came into force on 2 December 1996. This article
examines the rights that they confer on people with
epilepsy and the residual scope for enhancing those
rights. Particular attention will be paid to the criteria
which govern access to the protection offered by the
DDA, the duties it imposes on employers and to en-
forcement methods. By exploring the impact of the
DDA on the recruitment process and employment, we
show that legislation has only partly succeeded in dis-
pelling the problems faced by people with epilepsy in
relation to work.
DDA cases, particularly those involving applicants
with epilepsy, will be referred to throughout the text.
We should explain that claims alleging disability dis-
crimination are first heard by Employment Tribunals
(formerly known as Industrial Tribunals) and that ap-
peals lie to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and
thence to the Court of Appeal. It should be noted at the
outset that only Court of Appeal and Employment Ap-
peal Tribunal judgements set binding precedents, thus
providing authoritative interpretations of the new law.
The decisions of Employment Tribunals do not have
to be followed by other Tribunals.∗ Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
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Only people able to prove that they have1, or have
had2, a disability, are eligible for DDA protection.
There is no cover for people wrongly perceived or
diagnosed as having a disability, even if the perception
or misdiagnosis attracts discrimination. The (Conser-
vative) Government, which introduced the DDA, con-
sidered that the law ‘would not be credible if it em-
braced people who were not fairly or generally rec-
ognized as disabled’3. This restrictive approach is,
however, unhelpful in the context of epilepsy with its
unusually high incidence of misdiagnosis4. Patients
wrongly diagnosed as having epilepsy, who suffer un-
fair treatment as a result, have no redress under the
DDA. It is worth noting that their counterparts in the
United States fare better under the Americans with
Disabilities Act 1990 which protects against discrimi-
nation resulting from misclassification5.
How, then, is disability defined in the DDA? Ac-
cording to Section 1(1), people have a disability if they
have a physical or mental impairment which has a sub-
stantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability
to carry out normal day-to-day activities. People who
have had a disability in the past are protected by virtue
of Section 2.
Although it is uncertain whether Members of Par-
liament regarded epilepsy as a ‘mental’ or ‘physical’c© 1999 BEA Trading Ltd
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is covered6. Meeting the impact requirements of the
DDA definition of disability may, however, be more
problematic for people with epilepsy. Where epilepsy
has little or no impact on day-to-day activities be-
cause it is successfully controlled by medication, it
falls within the ambit of the DDA because of the spe-
cial provisions in relation to medical treatment of dis-
abilities contained in Schedule 1, Paragraph 67. How-
ever, people not on medication, who experience only
simple partial seizures, or sleep seizures, will have dif-
ficulty showing the ‘substantial and long-term adverse
effect’ on their ability to carry out day-to-day activi-
ties which the DDA insists upon. There may also be
people, again not on medication, whose epilepsy did
once have a substantial adverse effect, but fails the
‘long-term’ test because the impact was shorter than
the 12 months fixed as the minimum by the DDA, and
is unlikely to recur8.
As the first major study of the DDA’s operation
shows9, some employers do challenge claimants on
each component of the definition of disability. Al-
though applicants with mild forms of epilepsy may
well lose their case on this preliminary issue, we
should point out that out of the monitored ‘heard’
(as opposed to settled or withdrawn) cases involving
epilepsy which we could trace, none failed on the def-
inition of disability10. This may, unfortunately, merely
reflect the fact that would-be claimants dared not pur-
sue their claims because their epilepsy did not meet
the requirements of the DDA definition.
In order to protect everyone diagnosed as having
epilepsy from discrimination, the DDA should omit
the definitional requirement of long-term, substantial
impact and cover any disability, however short-lived
or slight. Why should mildly disabled people be left
to fend for themselves when they fall victim to preju-
dice? They may be less at risk of meeting discrimina-
tion, but when they do meet it, they need redress as
much as severely disabled people do. This is particu-
larly so with epilepsy:
. . . very few people have experience of
it and so the word gets around: ‘Of course
you know, he’s got epilepsy’. Most peo-
ple do not have a clue what the condition
is, how it exhibits itself, its frequency, or
what effect it has on a person’s life—it
just sounds horrible11.
Widening the definition of disability to encompass
conditions with minor and/or short-lived effects would
suit job applicants and employees with epilepsy with-
out unduly burdening employers, as the latter should
have few problems accommodating mild disability in
the workplace. It must, however, be acknowledged that
even a wide definition of disability will still permit em-ployers to argue that a particular person falls outside
its ambit. It follows that DDA claimants with epilepsy
should be prepared to present medical evidence show-
ing that their condition meets the statutory require-
ments.
Research shows that both applicants and respon-
dents are worried by the cost of medical evidence.
They are also concerned that the usual sources of
medical evidence, particularly GPs and occupational
health professionals, are unequal to the task of relat-
ing their expertise to DDA requirements, because of
lack of familiarity with the DDA approach, definitions
and terminology12. Objective appraisals of the medi-
cal risks to self and others associated with a particular
individual doing a particular job are hard to come by13.
In Holmes v. Whittingham & Porter Ltd14, the medi-
cal report used as the basis for a risk assessment of the
applicant who had epilepsy was prepared by the ap-
plicant’s GP and the employer’s medical adviser, also
a GP. It advised against continuing to let Mr Holmes
work in his customary environment and capacity, and,
as a result, Mr Holmes lost his job. The Tribunal which
dealt with the case took the view that the employ-
ers should have consulted a specialist in occupational
medicine or epilepsy before sacking their employee,
in order to investigate the potential benefits of chang-
ing the latter’s medication, and/or adjusting his work-
ing conditions. Even where experts become involved,
however, problems of risk assessment may persist: in
Smith v. Carpets International UK plc15, another case
involving epilepsy, a report by the applicant’s neurolo-
gist, to the effect that the applicant could safely resume
work, was successfully challenged by the employer’s
doctor on the basis that the neurologist had no insight
into the hazards of Mr Smith’s work environment. The
case of Bragg v. London Underground Ltd16 (involv-
ing genetic hearing loss) indicates that where health
experts disagree among themselves, the employer is
entitled to make a choice provided that the chosen ex-
pert opinion is not obviously flawed.
Even where people with epilepsy can prove them-
selves to be within the DDA definition of disability,
access to protection against disability discrimination
will be denied if the employer suspected of such dis-
crimination falls within one of the statutory exemp-
tions. The employment provisions of the DDA do not
apply to businesses with fewer than 15 employees, nor
to fire services, the armed forces, the police and other
specified employers17.
The small business exemption significantly restricts
the availability of protection under the DDA. Its im-
pact is potentially most serious for people with im-
paired mobility or who are forbidden to drive, as many
people with epilepsy are. This is because small busi-
nesses are often more accessible than larger ones, be-
ing within, or close to, residential areas, and often eas-
414 L. Delany & J. E. Moodyier to reach by public transport. Further, in many rural
areas, small businesses are the norm, and people with
epilepsy are therefore effectively deprived from any
protection in such locations.
Why was the exemption considered necessary? It re-
flects Government concerns that small firms lack the
financial resources and personnel expertise to imple-
ment the protection conferred by the DDA on peo-
ple with disabilities. However, built into the DDA, is
a mechanism for ensuring that no undue burdens are
placed on employers. As we shall discuss more fully
later, the latter have a complete defence against claims
of discrimination if they had a substantial reason, ma-
terial to the individual case, for what they did, and
took account of the duty to make reasonable adjust-
ments where appropriate. Whether reasonable adjust-
ments have been made must be judged in the light
of, among other factors, the employer’s resources. So
even without a small business exemption, less effort
need be made by poorly resourced businesses than by
well-resourced ones. This renders the exemption su-
perfluous and it should be removed from the DDA.
The occupation-based exemptions are predicated on
concerns about the capacity of people with disabili-
ties to work in stressful and often hazardous posts or
work environments, but they too are superfluous. The
DDA already allows employers to reject employees or
job applicants if they cannot substantially match job
requirements. There is no need for an additional pre-
sumption that certain jobs will always prove too de-
manding for people with disabilities. At the time of
writing, the Home Office seems prepared to concede
this point in relation to the police, prison and fire ser-
vices, whereas the Ministry of Defence remains reluc-
tant to surrender the armed forces exemption18.
RECRUITMENT
Under the DDA, discrimination can take two forms.
One involves an employer treating people less
favourably than others for a reason related to their
disability, without being able to show that such treat-
ment is justified (Section 5(1)). The other entails an
employer failing to comply with his or her statutory
duty of making reasonable adjustments to accommo-
date, without being able to justify such a failure (Sec-
tion 5(2)). It is unlawful for employers to discriminate
in either of these ways when recruiting or promoting
employees (Section 4).
In relation to advertisements and job specifications,
employers discriminate if they proscribe disabilities
which would not (after reasonable adjustments) affect
work performance, or if they insist on unnecessary
skills, achievements or qualities. A blanket exclusion
of people with epilepsy is thus discriminatory19. Anemployer who asks for a driving licence, discriminates
against those people with epilepsy who by law can-
not hold a licence unless the employer can show that
travelling is a genuine job requirement which cannot
reasonably be performed except by the job applicant
driving him or herself. An employer who asks for will-
ingness to do shiftwork similarly discriminates against
people whose epilepsy makes shiftwork undesirable,
if there is either no real need for shiftwork, or such
a need exists but could be met by other employees
within their terms of employment. Assessing an em-
ployer’s genuine needs remains a problem: the DDA
does not compel employers to specify essential job
functions, and this means that job applicants continue
to have difficulties gauging their own suitability for a
particular post, as well as the validity of any functional
or health requirements listed by the employer.
The DDA does not prevent employers enquiring
whether someone has a disability. However, the Code
of Practice20 which accompanies the legislation, rec-
ommends that an employer should only ask about a
disability if it might interfere with the performance of
necessary job functions21. It follows, in our opinion,
that employers, wishing to stay within the law, should
avoid general questions about epilepsy but could legit-
imately enquire about symptoms likely to affect func-
tional ability in a particular post22.
From the perspective of the job applicant with
epilepsy, any pre-employment questions about
epilepsy remain threatening. Truthful answers could
cause the prejudiced employer to reject the applicant.
The applicant could claim discrimination, but the em-
ployer might succeed in showing some plausible rea-
son other than prejudice, for the rejection. In any case,
not all applicants who suspect disability discrimina-
tion, are willing to put the matter to the test when it
takes confidence, money and skill to do so. They also
fear the possibility, that not their disability but some
CV deficiency or a poor reference lost them the job, or
that others made stronger candidates. Tribunals do not
infer discrimination merely from a failure to short-list
a disabled applicant23. Furthermore, legal representa-
tives and advisers are reluctant to pursue recruitment
claims unless they involve particularly blatant dis-
crimination24. It is perhaps not surprising that among
DDA claims, recruitment cases are least likely to be
successful25.
Not disclosing a disability such as epilepsy at all is
not, however, to be recommended to job applicants.
In the case of O’Neill v. Symm & Co26, the Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal ruled that as the employers had
no knowledge of their employee’s disability, the em-
ployee’s claim that they had treated her less favourably
as a result of her disability was bound to fail. Know-
ledge of merely the ‘material features’ of a disabil-
ity may suffice27 to implicate an employer, but what
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seizure disorders labelled epilepsy? In Ridout v. TC
Group28 the job applicant had declared that she suf-
fered from (medication-controlled) epilepsy. She at-
tended a job interview in a room lit by fluorescent
lighting but did not inform the employers that such
lighting could adversely affect her as a consequence
of her epilepsy. As a result, she lost her claim that the
employers had discriminated against her by failing to
make reasonable adjustments. The Tribunal indicated
that she should have been more forthcoming at her in-
terview by suggesting that the room was unsuitable for
her.
The DDA is designed to change the attitudes of em-
ployers vis-a`-vis potential or actual employees with
disabilities and to encourage a balance of communi-
cation and understanding between the two sides. It is
not designed to persecute employers who remain un-
aware of a disability. Although it is true that rejecting
claims, where the employers do not know of the dis-
ability, may encourage employers to refrain from ask-
ing about disabilities at all, it may conversely prompt
employees and job applicants to explain their particu-
lar needs, thus forcing employers to consider the rea-
sonable adjustments which should be made to avoid
liability and expensive claims.
Good practice in relation to recruitment requires at-
tention to the concerns of both employers and job ap-
plicants. Employers must be prepared to identify job
components, the health and functional requirements
of jobs and medical conditions deemed to be bars to
jobs. No. questions about health or disability should
be included in job application forms. Job applicants
could however be asked to complete health declaration
forms, but these should be kept entirely separate from
the job application form and should not be demanded
or submitted until applicants receive notification, that
they have been short-listed for interview, or of a con-
ditional job offer. Health declarations should be in-
spected only by those qualified to interpret them cor-
rectly. Medical examinations of job applicants should
be prohibited in all cases until a conditional job offer
has been made.
Principles of good practice similar to those just out-
lined have been advocated for several years in rela-
tion to the recruitment of people with epilepsy29. They
should become part of the DDA regime by incorporat-
ing them into the Code of Practice. Failure to observe
a ‘good practice’ tenet should raise an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of unlawful discrimination under the DDA.
The expansion of, and increased access to occupa-
tional health services would need to be prioritized by
the Government to make the changes workable.Less favourable treatment
As we explained in the preceding section on recruit-
ment, treating disabled people less favourably than
others is a key indicator of unlawful discrimination.
However, how should ‘less favourable treatment’ be
understood? In the 1998 case of Clark v. Novacold30
the Employment Appeal Tribunal delivered a judge-
ment to the effect that when deciding the issue of less
favourable treatment under Section 5(1) of the DDA,
it was necessary to compare the claimant with an able-
bodied employee in the same position. Mr Clark had
been absent from work on a long-term basis on ac-
count of his disability, and was compared with an able-
bodied employee who had been or would have been
absent for as long a time. His employers convinced the
Tribunal that both disabled and able-bodied employees
would have been dismissed on account of their absen-
teeism, and that Mr Clark was therefore not treated
less favourably than others.
In the subsequent case of British Sugar v. Kirker31,
the Employment Appeal Tribunal appeared to reject
its own reasoning in Clark. The DDA was said not
to require a like-for-like comparison, and therefore no
comparator was nominated. Clark went to the Court
of Appeal32 which, confirming Kirker, ruled that treat-
ment was less favourable if the reason for it did not or
would not apply to others.
The reason for Mr Clark’s treatment (the ultimate
dismissal) was held to be his absence from work. His
absence was a reason which related to his disabil-
ity. The DDA required the treatment given to him
(dismissal) to be compared with the treatment which
would have been given to someone to whom that rea-
son, absence from work, did not apply. In other words
the question was whether or not someone who had not
been absent from work would have been dismissed.
The answer was clearly no.
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal re-
flected the intentions of Parliament which, during the
Second Reading of the Bill introducing the DDA, had
been told by the Minister for Social Security and Dis-
abled People:
The Bill is drafted in such a way that in-
direct as well as direct discrimination can
be dealt with. . . . A situation where dogs
are not admitted to a cafe´, with the effect
that blind people would be unable to en-
ter it, would be a prima facie case of in-
direct discrimination against blind people
and would be unlawful33.
According to the original decision in Clark, the blind
people in the above example would not have been
treated less favourably than others, as all dogs were
banned from the cafe´, thus there would have been no
416 L. Delany & J. E. Moodydiscrimination and the DDA would be redundant. To
render the DDA effective, the comparators must be
‘others’ without dogs. The reason, (being accompan-
ied by a dog) for being refused access to refreshments
in the cafe´, would not apply to ‘others’ without dogs,
yet clearly the presence of a guide dog relates to the
blind person’s disability.
The preferable approach for Tribunals to now take
in light of the Court of Appeal’s decision is to ask:
(1) Was the applicant dismissed for a reason relat-
ing to his or her disability?
(2) If yes, did the respondents treat him or her less
favourably than they would treat others to whom
that reason did not apply?
Therefore it would seem that it is relatively easy for an
applicant to prove the issue of less favourable treat-
ment. However, in addition to this, there is a fur-
ther and more difficult obstacle to overcome. Sec-
tion 5(1)(b) states that such treatment is only discrim-
inatory if the employer cannot show that it is justified.
If the employer justifies his or her actions then clearly
the applicant will lose his or her case. This issue will
be discussed in more detail once we have considered
discrimination through a failure to make reasonable
adjustments.Reasonable adjustments
Section 5(2) of the DDA states that employers fur-
ther discriminate against a disabled person if they fail
to make reasonable adjustments to the arrangements
and the physical features of the workplace, thus leav-
ing disabled people at a substantial disadvantage com-
pared with others. An inexhaustive list of which ad-
justments can reasonably be made is set out in Sec-
tion 6(3), although Section 6(4) insists that the finan-
cial and practical implications for the employer of im-
plementing such reasonable adjustments ought to be
considered, thereby creating a balance between the in-
terests of the employees and employers.
Statistics on the various causes of action brought be-
fore the Employment Tribunals since the DDA was in-
troduced, show that a failure to make reasonable ad-
justments was the second most common reason for
commencing a case. Twenty-five percent of cases were
brought because of an alleged failure to make reason-
able adjustments34.
However, it is submitted that this figure will eventu-
ally fall for two reasons. Firstly because the Court of
Appeal in Clark highlighted the necessity for employ-
ers of carrying out any reasonable adjustments before
they could validly argue justification, there may now
be an increase in the number of employers preparedto make reasonable adjustments, before they incur the
costs of litigation. Already in Holmes v. Whittingham
& Porter Ltd35, referred to earlier in connection with
the issue of medical evidence, an Employment Tri-
bunal had stated that one of the reasons why the ap-
plicant would win his case was that his employers had
failed to consider the adjustments that could have been
made in his working conditions before they dismissed
him on account of his epilepsy. Now the Court of Ap-
peal has reinforced this approach.
Secondly there is some evidence that firms are gen-
erally becoming more aware of the requirement to
make reasonable adjustments, and prepared to comply.
When we informally asked a selection of firms about
their policy on employing people with epilepsy, 42%
implicitly or explicitly indicated that they were pre-
pared to make reasonable adjustments.
Very few of the employers asked had looked at the
pre-employment stage with a view to making reason-
able adjustments. Only 8% specifically confirmed that
they would make reasonable adjustments at the inter-
view stage, leading to the possibility that applicants
with epilepsy might find themselves at a disadvan-
tage at an early stage in the recruitment process. How-
ever, it must be acknowledged that this state of affairs
threatens applicants with epilepsy less than applicants
with other disabilities, for there is often no need for ad-
justments at the interview stage for an applicant with
epilepsy. That is not to say that there can never be a re-
quirement for such adjustments, as highlighted in the
case of Ridout v. TC Group36 which we discussed in
connection with recruitment.
It is imperative, in our opinion, that in appropriate
cases, the employer and the applicant should com-
municate immediately after the applicant has been
short-listed for interview, with both parties requesting
and offering information, thereby averting the poten-
tial danger of the employer lacking knowledge of the
epilepsy, and consequently failing to make any reason-
able adjustments at the interview stage.
A further advantage of making enquiries at an early
stage is that employers may be put at ease with regard
to the reasonable adjustments which must be under-
taken, in order to accommodate the individual during
the course of his or her potential employment, thus dis-
placing any misconceptions they may have previously
held. Both parties will know what is expected of them
and there will not be any surprises mid-employment.
Our enquiries highlighted that very few employers
consulted the individual applicants themselves about
the reasonable adjustments which could be made ei-
ther before or during their employment. Only 13%
consulted applicants during the recruitment process,
yet consultation with applicants is essential for they
are likely to have the best understanding of their
epilepsy. For example, questions could be asked with
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ma view to assessing the applicants’ understanding
and management of their epilepsy, their compliance
with any medication, the degree of control over their
epilepsy and any problems they themselves foresee
vis-a`-vis their potential employment, although the em-
ployer would be wary of the fact that applicants may
hide the true extent of their epilepsy either through
fear of not securing employment or through embar-
rassment37.
Consultation would also have the advantage of dis-
couraging employers from viewing applicants with
epilepsy en bloc. Each case, and in particular the in-
dividual’s ability to perform his or her duties, should
be judged on its own merits, something which is at
present done by only 16% of our employer respon-
dents. When it comes to assessing the potential ef-
fects of a disability on a person’s functional capacity,
it is wholly insufficient to attach labels to the different
forms of a particular disability. This is particularly true
of epilepsy, where some of the employers we ques-
tioned were still using what is now considered to be
out-of-date terminology such as ‘petit mal’ and ‘grand
mal’, with one employer going so far as to state that
they were unaware that there were different forms of
epilepsy. The effects of a disability must be considered
as opposed to the actual disability itself as every dis-
ability varies according to its severity, its effects and
its treatment. To fully understand the implications of a
particular person’s epilepsy for a particular work envi-
ronment or job, occupational health expertise may be
needed. Occupational health advice should be widely
available to job applicants, employees and employers
and the Government must play its part in improving
access.
Justification
Both Sections 5(1)(b) and 5(2)(b) of the DDA specif-
ically require employers to prove that their less
favourable treatment of their employee, or their fail-
ure to make reasonable adjustments is justified.
When delivering the leading Court of Appeal judge-
ment in Clark38 Mummery LJ stated:
As things have turned out, the critical
question in this case is that of justification
of the treatment. This will also probably
be the case with many other complaints
under the 1995 Act.
When deciding the issue of justification, the Employ-
ment Tribunal will consider a number of points indi-
vidual to each particular case. Justification has to be
material to the circumstances of the case and it must
be substantial, meaning ‘not minor’ and having sub-
stance, that is to say, capable of being objectively jus-
tified39.The case of Jordan v. J. H. Haskins & Sons Ltd40
ill serve as an illustration. In that case an employee
as dismissed by reason of his occasional epileptic
eizures in the workplace, which were said to alarm
is colleagues. The factors which the Employment Tri-
unal held to be of importance were that the employers
ad not followed the Code of Practice by, firstly hav-
ng discussions with the employee himself about what
he real effects of the disability might be or what might
elp, and secondly by making use of available exper-
ise about the problem, particularly from the kind of
reely available documentation produced by the em-
loyee. Had staff been given sufficient information
bout their colleague’s epilepsy, they would have felt
ore at ease. The failure of the employers to educate
hemselves and their staff about epilepsy fatally under-
ined their justification defence.
The large number of cases which have been remitted
o the Employment Tribunals from the Employment
ppeal Tribunals on the issue of justification, suggests
hat the Employment Tribunals are failing to properly
onsider justification in sufficient detail to the disad-
antage of both employees and employers.
emedies
ection 8 of the DDA outlines the three remedies
vailable to a successful applicant, and each will be
nalysed in turn.
Under Section 8(2)(a), a Tribunal can make a dec-
aration, which is usually available where either the
pplicant has not suffered any measurable loss, or a
oint of principle is involved. A Tribunal may use its
eclaratory powers to encourage an employer to take
ositive steps, for example by offering the applicant
mployment or reinstatement, but the legal effects of
uch declarations are doubtful41: unlike recommenda-
ions, they cannot be enforced.
Tribunals may make a recommendation under Sec-
ion 8(2)(c). These generally urge the employer to take
easonable steps to address shortcomings, within a
pecified period of time. It however remains a moot
oint whether a Tribunal can recommend that an ap-
licant be appointed to the post he or she applied
or42. Furthermore, in one decision the Employment
ribunal felt itself powerless to order that a reference
e written for the applicant by his former employers,
nd relied on the hope that the employers would ‘co-
perate and adopt the spirit of [the] decision’43.
In view of the emphasis on encouraging employers
o make reasonable adjustments to accommodate dis-
bled employees, it is thought that there will be a shift
rom the remedy of awarding compensation to that of
aking a recommendation.
418 L. Delany & J. E. MoodyUnder Section 8(5), if an employer fails to comply
with a recommendation, then a Tribunal may either in-
crease the amount of compensation to be awarded to
the applicant where a compensation order had already
been made, or make an order for compensation under
Section 8(2)(b).
By virtue of Section 8(3), an applicant can make a
claim for compensation under any or all of the follow-
ing three heads of damages.
(a) Actual losses. This covers the period up to the
date of the Tribunal judgement, provided that
the loss is attributable to the discriminatory act.
(b) Future losses. This will include the future loss
of earnings and any fringe benefits the applicant
would have been entitled to. However, the dura-
tion of the future period may be limited by the
Tribunal.
(c) Injury to feelings. Section 8(4) states that the
applicant will be entitled to compensation for
this, regardless of the success of the claims
made under the previous two heads of damages.
Such awards can differ significantly in size from
case to case. For example at one end of the
scale is the case of Buxton v. Equinox Design
Ltd44 where an applicant with multiple scle-
rosis was awarded £500. In the middle of the
range is Calvert v. Jewelglen Ltd t/a Parkview
Nursing Home45 where the Employment Tri-
bunal awarded the applicant, who had epilepsy,
£2500 on finding that the applicant was ‘ex-
tremely hurt’ by the ‘demeaning and degrading’
treatment he had received. Another case con-
cerning an applicant with epilepsy (Holmes v.
Whittingham46) similarly falls into the middle
of the range, with an award of £4250. At the
high end of the scale is Mitchell v. Raychem47
where the applicant who suffered from depres-
sion was awarded £15 000 for the injury to his
feelings, as a consequence of the treatment he
received from his employers which led to a de-
terioration of his condition.
A recent survey for the Equal Opportunities Review
has shown that compensatory awards by Employment
Tribunals to disability discrimination victims, have
soared by 300%. Last year the average award stood
at £11 500, three times that in 199748.
A disability rights commission
The remedies discussed in the last section are at
present available only to individuals. No. statutory en-
forcement agency, equivalent to those set up under theRace Relations and Sex Discrimination legislation of
the 1970s was established under the DDA. As a result,
there is no mechanism for investigating and tackling
discrimination within a business or an entire sphere of
employment. Nor can aggrieved individuals obtain ad-
vice and legal representation from a central source of
DDA expertise.
Legislation creating a Disability Rights Commis-
sion to address such issues, is now however before
Parliament49. The Commission will be empowered to
conduct formal investigations which may culminate
in non-discrimination notices, demanding compliance
with DDA duties. It will also be able to offer legal ad-
vice and representation to potential claimants. In de-
ciding whether to help an individual, the Commission
will be expected to consider whether the case raises
a question of principle, but also whether ‘it is unrea-
sonable to expect the applicant to deal with the case
unaided’50.
We are unable to predict how the Commission will
exercise its discretion and the proportion of claims
likely to gain its support. That support is vital in se-
curing DDA rights for individuals can no longer be
doubted51.
CONCLUSION
Understanding of the DDA by the Employment Tri-
bunals and Courts is steadily increasing, and recent
decisions reflect the spirit and intention of the legisla-
tion. This is particularly so with regard to proving less
favourable treatment, now that the Court of Appeal
has made a binding judgement implementing the over-
all purpose of the DDA. Although proving a failure to
make reasonable adjustments remains more difficult, a
new appreciation of an employer’s duty to make such
adjustments, is, we have argued, likely to emerge.
A number of problems continue to beset the litiga-
tion process in our view. One is the failure on the part
of Tribunals to properly consider the issue of justifi-
cation at the initial hearing of the case. When the case
reaches the Employment Appeal Tribunal, it must then
be remitted on that point to the Employment Tribunal,
costing money and time, and prolonging what is al-
ready a stressful experience for the parties. However,
the Court of Appeal judgement in Clark, referred to
earlier, which highlighted the importance of the justi-
fication defence, may be effecting a positive change.
We also find that the declaratory remedy war-
rants further consideration. We question whether Tri-
bunals should have the option of awarding a rem-
edy which the applicant cannot enforce. Declarations
should be withdrawn, leaving only the two enforce-
able remedies of recommendations and compensation
in place.
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